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ABSTRACT 
 Small businesses occupy an iconic place in American public policy debates.  This paper 
discusses interactions between the federal tax code, small business, and the economy.  We 
summarize the characteristics of small businesses, identify the tax provisions that most affect 
small businesses, and review evidence on the impact of tax and other policies on entrepreneurial 
activity.  We also examine evidence suggesting that it is young firms, not small ones, where job 
growth and innovation tend to occur.  Policies that aim to stimulate young and innovative firms 
are likely to prove different than policies that subsidize small businesses.    
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I. Introduction  
 
          Small businesses occupy an iconic place in American public policy debates. Numerous 
and diverse public policies subsidize small businesses, and political leaders of both parties 
routinely voice their support for the sector. At least part of this support is based on the notion 
that a healthy small business sector leads to innovation, jobs, and a healthy overall economy.  
Not surprisingly, however, the economic issues surrounding small businesses and 
innovation are more complex and nuanced than any iconic designation would suggest. At the 
core of these issues are the questions of whether and how public policies should subsidize small 
businesses. On the one hand, economic theory prescribes that well-designed tax and spending 
programs, in the absence of externalities or public goods, should be neutral among types of 
investments and forms of business organization, leaving a free market to allocate resources 
efficiently between small versus large business. On the other hand, small business owners may 
face special barriers to entry or to firm expansion and many people assert that the small business 
sector is our principal engine of jobs, growth, and innovation. Either or both of these situations 
might justify preferential treatment for the small business sector.  Recent proposals by 
Representative Dave Camp (R-MI), the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, address 
a number of issues regarding the tax treatment of partnerships and S corporations.
1
 
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to provide a clearer understanding of how the 
federal tax code affects small business. In section II, we provide background information on the 
small business sector, including alternative definitions of small businesses, the tax and income 
characteristics of small business owners, and the allocation of small businesses across different 
legal forms of business.  
In section III, we examine evidence suggesting that being small, in and of itself, does not 
confer a special advantage to businesses in job creation or innovation. Rather it is in young firms, 
which by definition start as small businesses, where job growth and innovation tend to occur. 
Focusing on young and innovative firms likely implies a different focus for policy interventions 
than focusing on small businesses per se.  
Section IV describes various tax policies and other public programs that are aimed at 
helping small businesses. We document the panoply of existing tax incentives and the significant 
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See http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/small_biz_summary_description_03_12_13_final.pdf. 
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credit and lending programs that encourage small businesses to hire, expand, and innovate. At 
the same time, we note that when pro-small business subsidies or policies are phased out as firm 
size expands, they may unintentionally discourage businesses from expanding because expansion 
will lead to loss of those subsidies. 
Section V analyzes the existing literature on the impact of tax policies on small business 
behavior, including entry, exit, duration of entrepreneurial firms; the impact on employment, 
investment, and firm growth; the effect on research and experimentation spending, which 
presumably leads to innovations; the effect on organizational form; and the effects of taxes on 
the financing of new ventures. Section VI offers concluding remarks.  
 
II. Background on the Small Business Sector  
 
A.  Defining small business  
Despite the common use of the term “small business,” there is no single all-encompassing 
definition of a small business. Alternative definitions exist in part for data reasons – no single 
data source has all of the relevant information – but also, importantly, for conceptual reasons. 
Businesses can be defined as small as a function of their employment, assets, gross receipts or 
other characteristics, and for different policy purposes, different definitions may be most 
relevant.  
 
Small Business Administration Definition  
The Small Business Administration (SBA) was created by Congress in 1953 with the 
goal of supporting small businesses, broadly defined as those that are “independently owned and 
operated and which [are] not dominant in [their] field[s]of operation.”2 To implement this goal, 
SBA uses various definitions for small businesses to reflect industry characteristics in which the 
business operates.  
SBA industry definitions of small businesses use either a firm’s annual net receipts or its 
employment. To be eligible for SBA assistance and for contracts reserved for small businesses, 
firms must have income or employment below the SBA’s threshold. In most industries other than 
manufacturing and mining, the “size standard” is $7 million in average annual net receipts for the 
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 The broad definition of small businesses is provided in the Small Business Act of 1953. 
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previous three years. For many manufacturing and mining industries, the SBA uses employment 
for its size standard: in general, businesses can employ no more than 500 employees on average 
during the past twelve months to be considered small.  
The SBA adjusts these standard definitions in several cases, depending on industry 
characteristics. For example, in some service and retail industries (including computer 
programming firms, architectural firms, grocery stores, and department stores), the SBA has 
increased the annual receipts threshold to $35.5 million. Similarly, employment thresholds can 
vary, too. Petroleum refineries and wireless communication carriers can employ as many as 1500 
employees and still be considered small while merchant wholesalers can employ no more than 
100 employees and still qualify.  
Using a small business definition of 500 employees, the United States had 27.9 million 
small businesses in 2010.
 3
 About 6 million small businesses employed between 1 and 499 
people (other than the owner). The remaining 22 million were non-employer firms (i.e. had no 
employees other than the owner) (SBA 2012). Small businesses with employees accounted for 
49 percent of aggregate employment and 43 percent of payroll in 2010 and 38 percent of 
business receipts net of taxes in 2007.
4
  
Definitions based on tax returns  
A second common approach to identifying small businesses (and the characteristics of 
small business owners) is to use information from income tax returns. From a tax perspective, a 
small business can be organized as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited liability 
company (LLC), an S corporation, or a C corporation. These alternative legal forms differ in 
their consequences for taxes, liability, and other factors.  
 Sole proprietorship refers to unincorporated businesses that are owned and run by a 
single individual. The owner receives all profits, and assumes all liabilities of the company. For 
sole proprietorships, net business income or loss is included in the owner’s adjusted gross 
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 The U.S. Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics generally do not report a firm’s annual receipts, but they do collect 
employment data. The SBA, therefore, uses its general manufacturing and mining threshold of 500 employees as the 
“standard” threshold for small businesses when reporting data. 
 
4
 Data for 2010 is from the 2012 Survey of Small Businesses (SUSB). Although the US Census has finished the 
2012 economic census, the first statistics will not be publicly available until December 2013. Data for 2007 is from 
the 2008 SUSB. 
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income reported on the individual income tax return and subject to individual income tax. Sole 
proprietors are also responsible for payroll tax on their profits from the business, in addition to 
any payroll tax they must remit for employees.
5
  
 Partnerships, LLCs and S corporations have more than one owner, and are collectively 
referred to as “pass-through” entities. Unlike C corporations described below, they do not pay a 
separate business-level tax on their profits. Instead, business profits and losses are allocated to 
owners, who add the profits to (subtract the losses from) income that is subject to individual 
income tax. 
Partnerships are unincorporated businesses that have at least two owners. For tax 
purposes, partnerships are deemed to distribute all profits, losses and credits to their owners, 
where they are taxed as part of the partners’ individual income. General partners are considered 
to be self-employed under the law and thus are liable for SECA taxes from partnership income, 
similar to sole proprietors. Distributions to limited partners, however, are subject to only income 
taxes, not payroll taxes. 
 An S corporation is a corporation that chooses to be subject to the regulations contained 
in Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. It is different from a C corporation in several 
respects: it cannot have more than 100 shareholders, it can only have one class of stock, and 
shareholders must be residents of the United States and cannot be a for-profit corporation or a 
partnership (trusts, estates, and non-profit corporations, however, are permissible).  
An LLC (or limited liability company) is an unincorporated association that shares 
characteristics of both corporations (e.g. limited the financial liability for members) and 
partnerships (e.g. pass-through income taxation). LLCs by default are taxed as partnerships but 
they can choose to be taxed as sole proprietorships, S corporations, or C corporations; they also 
require less record keeping than a C or S corporation and can distribute income, losses, and 
credits according to an operating agreement, unlike an S corporation which must make 
distributions based on company ownership.  
Like partnerships, LLCs and S corporations do not pay federal income tax as entities: the 
company’s profit and losses and credits are passed along to owners and taxed as part of their 
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 Sole proprietors pay Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes on net income below the Social Security 
wage base. SECA taxes function like the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes under a traditional 
employer-employee relationship. The owner can deduct half of SECA taxes as an adjustment to his or her gross 
income, similar to how an employer can deduct its share of FICA taxes as a business expense.  
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individual income. Unlike most partnerships, the owners’ allocated shares of profits from LLC’s 
and S corporations are not automatically assumed to be subject to SECA taxes. Rather, 
distributions are similar to those made to limited partners (LP) in partnerships: since the LP 
provides capital and not labor (or at least not without a separate pay statement that would then be 
subject to SECA taxes), he or she is not liable for SECA taxes on his or her partnership 
distribution.
6
 This creates an incentive for owner-employees to understate their wages, which are 
subject to income and payroll tax, and thereby overstate their profits, which are only subject to 
the owner-employee’s income tax. To counter this, the IRS applies as a “reasonable wage” 
standard, which is the wage the owner-employee would be willing to accept for performing the 
same job function for another company. If the IRS determines that the wages are not reasonable, 
then it may categorize a distributed profit as a wage and assign a penalty to the owner-employee.  
 Subchapter C corporations are taxed according to the corporate rate structure (Table 1). 
The corporate tax applies graduated tax rates of 15, 25, and 34 percent on corporate taxable 
income (i.e. total receipts less cost of goods sold less allowable deductions) below $100,000. For 
taxable income between $100,000 and $335,000, the marginal rate increases to 39 percent, which 
recaptures the revenue lost from taxing the first $100,000 of income at15 and 25 percent instead 
of at 34 percent. By the time the corporation has earned $335,000 in taxable income, its average 
tax rate is 34 percent, which it maintains until $10 million in income. Between $10 million and 
$15 million, the marginal corporate tax rate is 35 percent. A 38 percent rate recaptures the 
revenue lost to the 34 percent corporate tax rate between $15 million and $18.3 million, above 
which the corporate tax rate is effectively a flat 35 percent. 
A C corporation may choose to distribute profits to shareholders in the form of dividends, 
repurchase shares, or retain earnings to facilitate company growth. If dividends are distributed, 
they also face taxation at the shareholder level, creating a double-tax on corporate income.
7
 
However, this double-tax is not completely negated if a C corporation decides to retain earnings: 
                                                 
6
 The rules for LLC treatment of self-employment income are less well-defined than for S corporations and 
partnerships. Many tax practitioners assume that an LLC is less likely to be audited if its members follow the S 
corporation and partnership rules. 
7
 To help alleviate this burden, dividends were given a preferential rate of 15 percent in the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (Pub.L. 108-27). This lower rate was scheduled to expire in 2013, and dividends 
were to be taxed as ordinary income in 2013, but the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 made permanent a top 
tax rate of 20 percent for qualified dividends. 
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the signal of company growth should cause the price of company stock to rise. When the asset is 
sold, the gains would be subject to capital gains taxes.  
Measuring the characteristics of small businesses by their organizational status requires 
use of income tax return data. Historically, many researchers have defined a small business 
owner as a tax filer who reports on income or loss on Schedule C (non-farm sole 
proprietorships), Schedule E parts I or II (rental real estate, or partnerships and S corporations), 
or Schedule F (farming).
8
 
This “old” definition is straightforward but not ideal. The definition includes owners of 
very large firms – partners in hedge funds, for example. It includes laborers who happen to work 
as consultants rather than paid employees. It includes people who may have made or lost money 
pursuing hobbies. At the same time, it omits owners of small businesses that are organized as C 
corporations.  
Knittel et al. (2011) match individual income tax returns with returns filed by pass-
through businesses to more accurately identify small business owners. They collect 
documentation on business activity from Form 1065 (income from partnerships), Form 1120 
(income from S corporations), and Form 1120 (income from C corporations, whose total income 
or deductions are less than $10 million). They refine the definition of a business owner by 
requiring an individual tax return filer (a) to have at least $10,000 in business income or business 
deductions (or at least $15,000 in the sum of business income and deductions), and (b) to have at 
least $5,000 in wages and salaries, interest paid, the cost of goods and services bought from other 
firms, rents, and other business deductions.
9
 And to restrict the analysis to owners of small 
businesses, they exclude income individuals receive from business with more than $10 million in 
the sum of gross receipts, rents and portfolio income or those with business deductions in excess 
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 Treasury, TPC, CBO, and JCT have typically used pass-through status to classify an entity as a small business. For 
example, Treasury (2007) included as chapter that considered the importance of flow-through businesses to general 
business activity. Gale (2004) showed that few small business owners according to this specification faced the 
highest marginal tax rates. The JCT’s (2008) analysis of small business tax issues was more refined and used the 
IRS’s Statistics of Income to classify business organizations into size categories not by filing status, but by size of 
assets. 
 
9
 Knittel et al. (2011) use the first test (the De Minimis Activity Test) to separate actual businesses from those entities 
for whom “business” does not yield significant income. The second test (the Businesslike Activity Test) separates 
businesses from entities that primarily provide labor or are as investment vehicles, which do not usually report 
significant deductions. 
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of $10 million. Knittel et al. (2011) used receipts instead of employees as the small business 
threshold both because employment is not reported on tax forms and because many tax code 
provisions (see Section IV) for small businesses are based on gross receipts  
Using this methodology, Knittel et al. (2011) find that, of the 143 million tax filers in 
2007, 44.3 million reported some type of business income.  There were 42.4 million individuals 
had some type of flow-through income and 1.9 million C corporations (Table 2). Almost half of 
these (45.4 percent) did not meet the dual test to qualify for business activity, resulting in an 
estimated population of 24.2 million business filers. Almost all (23.9 million) business filers 
qualified met the $10 million threshold to qualify for a small business: 45 percent were non-
farm, non-rental sole-proprietorships, 9 percent were partnerships, 14 percent were Subchapter S 
corporations, and 7 percent had income from small C corporations.  
By industry, almost three out of ten small businesses were in the real estate and rental 
industry (Table 3). Construction firms garnered about 11 percent of the market and professional 
and technical firms were about 9 percent of small businesses. In terms of income, professional 
and technical firms accounted for 21 percent of small business net income while small financial 
firms yielded 17 percent and real estate and rental firms earned 16 percent.  
Knittel et al. (2011) further restricted their analysis to look at owners of small businesses 
by identifying the owners of partnerships and S corporations and combining their income from 
these activities with income from sole proprietorships, farms, and rental real estate. These 
calculations determined what the authors call their “broad” definition of small business owners. 
They also create a “narrow” definition that restricts the definition of small business owners to 
those who meet additional requirements: their business income is active rather than passive and 
business income provides more than 25 percent of the tax filer’s Adjusted Gross Income.  
Under Treasury’s broad definition, 14 percent of tax returns (or 20 million returns) 
qualified as small business owners in 2007 (Table 4). Small business income accounted for only 
13.3 percent of these filers’ AGI. Those with AGI less than $200,000 represented 89 percent of 
small business owners; yet they only accounted for 36 percent of small business income and 14 
percent of their income came from their small businesses (Table 5). Filers with AGI between 
$200,000 and $1 million accounted for 10 percent of small business owners and 47 percent of 
small business income; almost 23 percent of this group’s income came from small businesses. 
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For those above $1 million, small business income on average accounted for only 6 percent of 
total income. 
Under their narrow definition, the population of small business owners decreases to 9.4 
million (Table 4). However, small business income makes up a much larger portion of total 
income: 46.7 percent. For filers with AGI less than $200,000 (i.e. 92 percent of small business 
owners), the share of small business income increases to 43 percent and accounts for 40 percent 
of their income (Table 5). Those with AGI between $200,000 and $1 million earned 43 percent 
of small business income while representing 7 percent of small business owners; small business 
income accounted for 56 percent of their total income. 
 In contrast, the older definition based solely on Schedule C, E, and F provides an 
estimated population of 34.7 million owners (Table 4). Filers with AGI less than $200,000 
represented 92 percent of small business owners and only earned 24 percent of small business 
income (Table 5). Meanwhile, filers between $200,000 and $1 million accounted for 37 percent 
of small business income while representing only 7 percent of small business owners. 
 
III. Small business, innovation, and job creation  
There is a long-standing debate about the role played by small businesses in job creation 
in the United States. Indeed, policies to support small businesses are often justified based on the 
assumed effects of small businesses on the economy. What seems relatively clear is that most 
employers are small businesses and many employees work for small businesses. According to 
Small Business Administration’s definition of small businesses, small businesses make up more 
than 99 percent of U.S. firms with employees and account for 49 percent of private sector 
employment (SBA 2012).  
What is more controversial is the role of the small business sector as a force in net job 
creation. Birch (1979, 1981) claimed that small businesses created most of the new net jobs in 
the country between 1969 and 1976: 66 percent were created by firms with fewer than 20 
employees and 82 percent were created by firms with less than 100 employees. Using more 
recent data, the Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy (2012) estimates that, of the 
18.5 million net new jobs created in the United States between 1993 and 2011, small businesses 
(less than 500 employees) accounted for 11.8 million, or 64 percent. In 2011, businesses on net 
10 
 
added 2 million jobs, and small businesses of less than 500 employees accounted for 1.3 million, 
or 64 percent, of these net gains.  
 The interpretation of these results is controversial, however. The SBA statistics are 
derived from a very broad definition of a small firm as having 500 employees or less. If the 
appropriate definition of a small business involves a lower employment maximum, the numbers 
could be skewed by including larger companies. BLS’s Business Employment Dynamics 
suggests this may be the case: from 1992 until the first quarter of 2012, firms with fewer than 20 
employees on average accounted for about 20 percent of the historic net job gains. Expanding the 
threshold maximum to 49 would increase this proportion to 31 percent. It is not until one defines 
small businesses as firms between 1 and 249 employees that the proportion of private net jobs 
created by small businesses increases to 55 percent (BED 2012).
10
  
 Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) note three additional issues that muddy the 
relationship between firm size and employment growth. The first problem – called the size 
distribution fallacy -- occurs when the study does not follow individual firms and instead looks at 
aggregate numbers. If, for instance, a firm decreases in size from large in the first period to small 
in the second, it will cause aggregate employment figures in the small firm category to increase 
in the second period, thus giving an appearance that small firms have grown in employment 
when they haven’t. Using longitudinal data on individual businesses can address this problem.  
 The second problem arises from not distinguishing between net and gross job creation. 
Net job creation is the difference between gross job gains and gross job losses. Davis et al. 
(1996) use the example of three firms, one small and two large. The two large firms offset each 
other – one with a 200-employee gain and the other with a loss of the same size -- while the 
small firm hires 50 new people. In the example, the small business was responsible for all net job 
gains but only 20 percent of gross job gains.  
 The third problem is regression to the mean and arises from certain methodologies for 
determining business size. Birch (1979, 1981, 1987) classified firm sizes in the first period (base-
sizing), rather than in the latter period (end-sizing), and or as an average between the two periods 
(mean-sizing). Friedman (1992) shows that this is a common statistical error. Okolie (2004) 
shows that base-sizing, mean-sizing, and end-sizing can produce vastly different perspectives of 
net job flows. For example, suppose a firm had 250 employees in the first time period and added 
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 BED data starts in the third quarter of 1992. 
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another 350 employees over the next three month period. Under a base-sizing methodology, the 
increase in employment would be attributed to small firms. Under an end-sizing methodology, 
however, the gross job gain would be attributed to large firms.
11
 Viard and Roden (2009) and de 
Rugy (2005) note that base-sizing overstates apparent job gains at small firms and biases the 
results in favor of the conclusion that small businesses contribute to employment growth.  
  The problem of base-sizing is further aggravated by the data’s temporary fluctuations in 
size and its potential mismeasurement, which can create transitory spikes. If a large firm is 
temporarily reduced to a small firm classification due to a reduction in its workforce or statistical 
mismeasurement, it will show as small firm employment growth once the temporal anomaly has 
passed.  
More recent and careful studies correct for these issues. Davis et al. (1996) used a 
longitudinal dataset of manufacturing plant-level data from 1972-88 and found that the inverse 
relationship between employment growth and firm size disappeared after correcting for the 
problems: large manufacturing plants and firms were responsible for most new jobs and most 
jobs lost in the sector. Although smaller plants had greater gross job creation rates, they also had 
high gross job destruction rates, yielding net job creation rates that were not significantly 
different from larger plants.  
Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2008), however, tested this conclusion with a different 
longitudinal dataset, also correcting for the common data misinterpretations of prior studies. 
Although they did find the existence of an inverse relationship for both manufacturing and 
service sectors, the magnitude was much smaller than Birch’s estimates. 
The most recent critique of the small business sector as key to employment growth is also 
the strongest. While attention typically focuses on “small” business in relation to job creation, it 
appears that the true driver of new jobs are young and innovative firms. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda (2010) find, prior to adding age controls, an inverse relationship between firm size and 
net employment growth similar to Neumark et al. (2008). However, the correlation disappears 
after controlling for firm age. The apparent inverse relationship between size and growth is due 
to the fact that nearly all young firms start small—that is, it is not “small-ness” that is driving net 
job creation, it is relative youth. Indeed, Haltiwanger et al. (2010) find that startups are 
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 Aware of this limitation, the BLS uses a dynamic size classification methodology, whereby changes in 
employment are attributed to each size category through which a firm passes (see Butani et al. 2006). 
12 
 
responsible for about 20 percent of gross job creation; yet, young firms also have high gross job 
destruction rates; about 40 percent of the initial jobs created by startups are lost after five years 
by firm exit. If a young firm survives, though, it will tend to grow faster than its more mature 
small counterparts, who tend to be net job losers. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) suggest that this 
implies an “up or out” dynamic for small and young firms that is consistent with economic 
models of creative destruction in the marketplace; as a result, policies that focus on size without 
accounting for this dynamic are “likely to have limited success.”  
 Hurst and Pugsley (2011) provide additional evidence on these topics. Using the 2005 
Business Dynamic Statistics – a longitudinal establishment-level data set from the U.S. Census 
Bureau – they show that 87 percent of all operating firms are small by their definition of fewer 
than 20 employees. About 92 percent of young firms (less than 10 years of operation) and 86 
percent of mature firms (10-25 years of operation) are small. They interpret this as implying that 
most firms do not grow even as they age; rather most firms start and stay small. 
 They support this result with firm responses from the 2003 Survey of Small Business 
Finances. Between 2002 and 2003, 14 percent of all businesses with fewer than 20 employees 
added at least one employee; even among young small firms, only 19 percent added at least one 
employee. The numbers, however, do increase as the horizon grows longer: 21 percent of small 
added at least one employee between 2000 and 2003 and 28 percent of young small firms added 
at least one employee. About 61 percent of young small firms had no change in employment 
over that three year period. For these reasons, Hurst and Pugsley argue that employment growth 
is not common for the typical small business. 
 They also consult the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) to assess the magnitude of 
employment change among young firms.
12
 According to the survey, only 4 percent of surviving 
firms added more than ten employees between 2004 and 2008 and only 11 percent added more 
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 The Kauffman Foundation administers the KFS, which is a longitudinal study that follows 4,928 firms randomly 
sampled from the Dun & Bradstreet database of new firms in 2004. To ensure that the sample included only new 
firms, Kauffman limited the same to firms that had at least one of the following activities in 2004, and none in 2003: 
paying state unemployment insurance, paying FICA, have legal status for the business, use an employee 
identification number, or use schedule C to report business income on an individual income tax return. Firms have 
been surveyed for each year since 2004 and the latest published year of data is 2010. The next year of data will be 
released in March 2013. The KFS oversamples businesses that are high technology or that employ many research 
and development workers, and it provides sample weights to make the sample representative of all new firms in the 
economy. 
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than 5; 58 percent did not add any employees, suggesting that even among young firms, 
employment growth is not the norm. 
 Hurst and Pugsley (2011) also provide evidence that most small businesses are not 
engines of innovation. First, using the Statistics of U.S. Businesses, they show that over two-
thirds of American small businesses can be grouped into just 40 industries. These industries are 
not generally considered technologically innovative; rather, they include businesses such as 
restaurants, small professional practices, skilled craftsmen, and shop keepers.  
 Second, they offer evidence from Kauffman Firm Survey showing that just 2.7 percent of 
small businesses in the survey had applied for patents and less than 6 percent of new firms 
applied for patents, trademarks, and copyrights during their first few years in existence. 
Understanding that these measures may not be all-encompassing since firms may innovate and 
not patent their inventions, Hurst and Pugsley also reveal that less than 8 percent of new 
businesses reported they had developed any proprietary business practices or technology during 
their first few years of business. 
 
IV. Public policies toward small businesses 
 Numerous public policies favor small business either directly or indirectly.  In this 
section, we describe many of the major policies.  
A.  Tax policy for small business
13
  
Taxation of Sole Proprietorships and Pass-Throughs Relative to C Corporations. 
 The largest benefit that many small businesses receive through the tax code is being able 
to organize as a pass-through organization and avoiding the double taxation of corporate 
income.
14
 The business income of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations are 
taxed at the individual level, and an LLC can choose whether its business income is taxed as a 
partnership, sole proprietorship, S corporation, or C corporation. About 93 percent of small 
businesses file as flow-through organizations: 45 percent of small businesses are sole proprietors 
or have rental or farming income; 14 percent file as S corporations; and 9 percent file as 
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 The tax differential between corporate and non-corporate form goes beyond double taxation, including, using 
pass-through losses to offset non-business personal income and deferring tax liability within the corporate form.  
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partnerships (Knittel et al. 2011).
15
 Burnham (2012) documents the growth in the relative share 
of receipts accounted for by flow-throughs, and Sullivan (2011) specifically notes that the share 
of total business receipts earned by S corporations has grown substantially since the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, which lowered the top individual rate below the corporate rate: in 2008, S 
corporations accounted for 17.5 percent of total business receipts while they earned only 4.6 
percent in 1985. Similarly, the number of LLCs has grown since the 1988 IRS ruling that 
allowed LLCs to be taxed as partnerships: LLCs provided less than 1 percent of total business 
receipts in 1988 but accounted for 7.2 percent in 2008 (Sullivan 2011). 
Expensing of Investment (IRC Section 179) 
Normally, when a business purchases a piece of equipment, it must depreciate the cost of 
the investment over time in accordance with Internal Revenue Code Section 167 and 168 and the 
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System. Section 179, however, allows businesses to fully 
deduct the cost of purchasing equipment (and software through the 2013 tax year) in the year the 
purchase was made, provided that the equipment (or software) will be actively used in its trade 
or business. The immediate expensing offered by section 179 raises the net present value of the 
deductions that can be taken relative to depreciating the investment over time. It effectively 
increases the profitability of investment, potentially raising small businesses purchases of 
equipment and software.  
Prior to 2003, section 179 only applied to the first $25,000 of investment and phased out 
dollar for dollar as total investment exceeded $200,000.
 16
 If a business spent over $225,000, then 
Section 179 phased out completely. Both limits were raised in 2003 in the Jobs and Growth 
Reconciliation Act to $100,000 and $400,000 for tax years 2003 to 2005. Subsequent legislation 
extended this through 2006 and increased the limits to $125,000 and $500,000 for 2007 and 
$250,000 and $1 million for 2008 and 2009. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 increased the 
individual expensing limit to $500,000 in 2010 and 2011 and upgraded the reduction in 
limitation threshold to $2 million. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) extended 
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 Since LLCs can choose to file as any of the organizational forms, Knittel et al. (2011) did not report them. 
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 The latter limit is called the reduction in limitation and is an aggregate deduction maximum. A business can make 
as many Section 179 deductions in a single tax year and claim the full value of the deduction as long as the 
aggregate total does not exceed the reduction in limitation; above that threshold, the value of deduction is reduced 
dollar for dollar. A third limitation is the limitation based on income from trade or business, which says that the 
maximum total deduction cannot exceed the trade or business income for the individual or firm. 
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these limitations for 2012 and 2013. After 2013, the dollar limitation is scheduled to decrease to 
$25,000 and the reduction in limitation threshold will decrease to $200,000.  
Given these limits, Section 179 is clearly intended to benefit small and medium-sized 
businesses. The Joint Committee on Taxation (2013) estimates that extending the increased 
thresholds of Section 179 in ATRA will cost about $8.1 billion in revenue for 2013.  
Cash-Basis Accounting 
 The Internal Revenue Code requires companies to compute their taxable income via the 
same method by which they maintain their accounting books as long as the method is consistent 
in how it treats income and deductions across years. Although the IRS permits many methods, 
private sector firms most often use one of two: the cash-basis method and the accrual method. 
Cash-basis accounting treats transactions as income when income is actually received and 
expenses as deductions when they are paid. Accrual accounting, however, counts a transaction as 
income when the firm has a legal right to the income or as an expense when the firm becomes 
legally liable for it, whether the income has been received or the expense actually paid.  
The IRS generally requires accrual accounting for C corporations and for most other 
firms when inventory is necessary for operation of the business. Business size based on receipts, 
however, provides an exception; sole proprietors, partnerships, S corporations, C corporations 
with gross receipts averaging $5 million or less in the three previous tax years may use the cash 
method of accounting. In general, the cash-basis method is easier to administer and therefore 
lowers the compliance burden for these small businesses. Furthermore, if a sole proprietor, 
partnership, or S corporation averaged $1 million or less in annual gross receipts in the three 
previous tax years, it may also use cash-basis accounting to report purchases and sales of 
inventory items, which is not allowed for C corporations. The JCT (2012) estimates the cost of 
this tax expenditure for individual filers to be $1.1 billion in 2013.  
 
Exemption from the Corporate AMT 
The corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT) was created in 1986 to ensure that 
profitable corporations pay at least some federal income tax. The AMT applies a lower marginal 
rate of 20 percent to a base that includes fewer tax preferences in a parallel calculation to the 
regular corporate tax code; corporations must use the calculation that generates the larger tax 
liability and most business tax credits cannot be used to reduce corporate AMT tax liability. 
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The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, however, granted exemption from the corporate AMT 
based on size. In their first three tax years, small corporations are exempt as long as their average 
annual gross receipts do not exceed $5 million. After their first three years, their rolling three-
year average of annual gross receipts must not exceed $7.5 million – if the average exceeds $7.5 
million, then the corporation becomes ineligible for the AMT exemption, starting in the year it 
exceeded the limit and continuing thereafter. A corporation cannot regain AMT exemption once 
it has lost eligibility, even if its three-year average gross receipts once again drops below the $7.5 
million threshold. Neither the JCT nor the OMB include an estimate of the corporate AMT 
provision in their annual tax expenditure estimates, but Guenther (2009) suggested it may be less 
than $10 million per year.
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Amortization of Business Start-Up Costs (IRC Section 195) 
 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 created IRC Section 195, which allows the 
deduction of business start-up costs. Business taxpayers that incurred start-up costs after October 
22, 2004, are allowed to deduct up to $5,000 in business start-up and organizational costs for the 
tax year when the business begins, including those related to the investigation prior to starting 
the business. The maximum deduction of $5000 is reduced (down to $0) by the amount by which 
start-up costs exceed $50,000, which makes this especially beneficial to small firms. Large start-
ups, however, must capitalize these cost into the asset price of the business, which can only be 
recouped when the business is sold.
18
 Businesses that incurred these costs on or before October 
22, 2004, were allowed to deduct the costs in equal annual amounts over five years.  
 
Tax Incentives for Private Equity Investment in Small Firms 
The tax code also includes a number of provisions to encourage investment in start-up 
small firms. Section 1044 allows taxpayers to roll over any capital gains tax-free on the sale of 
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 The JCT specifically does not include the exemption as a tax expenditure because “the effects of the AMT 
exceptions are already included in the estimates of related tax expenditures” (JCT 2012). Even if the JCT did a tax 
expenditure estimate, the exemption may not exceed the $50 million de minimus requirement for JCT to report the 
cost of the tax expenditure. 
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 Under a normal income tax baseline, start-up costs should be excluded and capitalized into the asset as they are 
technically used to acquire an asset, not used to earn income. Section 195 deviates from this standard principle of 
federal income taxation.  
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publicly traded securities so long as the proceeds from the sale are used to purchase stock in 
specialized small business investment companies (SSBICs).
19
 Neither the JCT nor the Treasury 
have estimated the cost of this provision. 
Section 1202 allows taxpayers who are not C corporations to partially exclude a capital 
gain from selling or exchanging a qualified small business stock
20
, provided it has been held for 
longer than 5 years. Prior to 2009, the exemption was 50 percent and rose to 60 percent in 
empowerment zones; the exemption amount was increased in 2009 and ATRA extended a full 
exemption through 2013. This provision aims to facilitate the acquisition of capital from stock 
sale by small C corporations – those with gross assets less than $50 million. The OMB (2012) 
estimated that the exclusion of capital gains cost $60 million in 2012 while the JCT (2012) 
estimated a cost of $400 million.  
Section 1242 allows the capital losses on investments in stock in SBICs to be treated as 
ordinary income without limit; the IRS only allows an ordinary income deduction of $3000 for 
other capital losses. Neither OMB nor the Treasury have estimated the cost of this tax 
expenditure. Section 1244 is similar to 1242, but it applies to small business stock and has a 
maximum deduction of $50,000.
21
 The OMB (2012) estimated the cost at $60 million in 2012.  
 
Other Small Business Tax Incentives 
IRC Section 45E helps qualified small firms pay for the start-up costs of setting up 
employees in new retirement plans. The credit is equivalent to 50 percent of the first $1,000 in 
eligible costs incurred each of the first three years of a qualified pension (which can be a defined 
benefit or defined contribution plan). Firms with fewer than 100 employees are eligible to claim 
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 SSBICs are like SBICs (see Section IV.A.) except that they must invest in small firms that are owned by 
economically or socially disadvantaged individuals. 
20
 Only certain stocks meet the definition of a qualified small business stock. First, it must have been issued after 
August 10, 1993 and acquired at its original issue, either from the corporation directly or from an underwriter. 
Second, the business must be a domestic C corporation with less than $50 million in gross assets. Third, a 
supermajority of the corporations assets (80 percent) must be used for active business. Small firm in many 
commercial activities (e.g. law, architecture, health care, etc.) are not eligible for the partial exclusion. 
21
 Eligible stocks were issued after November 6, 1978 by a small business corporation, which is defined as having 
less than $1 million in money and property when it issues stock. The stock cannot have been exchanged for other 
stocks or securities, and a loss cannot be recognized unless the corporation received less than half of its receipts 
from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and stock and security transactions during the five years 
preceding the loss (IRC §1244(c)(1)(C)). 
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the credit, as long as employees received at least $5,000 in compensation from the firm in the 
previous year.  
IRC Section 44 allows qualifying small business – those with 30 or fewer employees and 
less than $1 million in gross receipts for the preceding tax year – to claim a credit for expenses 
used to make the business more accessible to disabled individuals by removing architectural and 
transportation barriers. The credit is equal to 50 percent of the amount of eligible expenditures 
above $250 and below $10,250. The JCT (2012) estimates the tax expenditure cost of this tax 
credit to be $100 million in 2013. 
IRC Section 263A exempts businesses with average annual gross receipts of $10 million 
or less in the three previous tax years from the uniform capitalization rule (UNICAP). Most firms 
that produce or trade merchandise must maintain inventories to determine the cost of goods sold 
– that is, the sum of the inventory at the beginning of the year and inventory purchased during 
the year less the inventory at the end of the year. Labor and material used to produce or purchase 
new inventory must be capitalized into the value of the inventory, and any allocable indirect 
costs are also capitalized. Small businesses, however, are exempt from these expensive 
administrative costs. The cost of this tax exemption is not known.  
 
Tax Compliance and Tax Evasion 
Along with the tax subsidies aimed at small businesses, the role of compliance and 
evasion among small business are also relevant to understanding the impact of federal taxes on 
the small business sector. The burden of complying with the tax system is significant. The IRS 
estimates that owners of small businesses (defined as less than $10 million in assets) spent 
between 1.7 and 1.8 million hours and around $15 billion in out-of-pocket expenses in preparing 
and filing tax returns in 2002 (DeLuca et, al 2007). Using estimates from Toder (2007) that value 
small business owners’ time at $45.40 per hour, the estimates above imply a total compliance 
burden of about $100 billion per year.  
The compliance burden – including the accounting and paper work costs of filling out tax 
forms – is larger relative to business size for small businesses than large ones (Slemrod and 
Venkatesh 2004). DeLuca et al (2007), using an estimate of small business owners’ time of $25 
per hour, estimate that compliance costs fall from around 150 percent of gross receipts for firms 
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with gross receipts lower than $10,000, to around 10 percent for those between $50,000 and 
$100,000, and fall to 0.3 percent for firms with receipts over $1 million.  
Small businesses account for a large share of tax evasion in the United States. According 
to detailed 2001 data provided by the Internal Revenue Service, business income accounted for 
about 55 percent of all underreporting of income in the income tax. The most recent available 
data, from 2006, provide approximately the same overall business share of underreporting of 
income but do not provide the detail discussed below, all of which refers to 2001 data. About 43 
percent of all business income that should have been reported on the income tax form was not 
reported. This figure is a weighted average of the underreporting rate for nonfarm proprietor 
income (57 percent), farm income (72 percent), rents and royalties (51 percent) and Partnerships, 
S Corporations and Trusts (18 percent). Individuals earning income from businesses have a 
higher chance of underreporting income since their earnings have fewer third party enforcement 
mechanisms. In 2001, the IRS estimated, for example, that for wages and salaries -- income 
sources that are subject to withholding and third party reporting – the underreporting rate was 1 
percent.  
 
B.  Other tax provisions that affect entrepreneurs and innovation 
It is worth noting that some tax policies favor large businesses, including specialized tax 
breaks like oil depreciation allowances.  These targeted breaks for large companies offset some 
of the relative subsidization of small businesses.  In addition, at least two important tax 
provisions have significant effect of entrepreneurship and innovation, even if they are not 
targeted toward small or young companies.   
 
Research and Experimentation Tax Incentives 
 The research and experimentation credit (IRC Section 41) was introduced in the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in an effort to spur new innovation. The credit was 
originally equal to 25 percent of a firm’s qualified research expenditures in excess of the average 
expenditures in the previous three years or 50 percent of the current year’s expenditures, 
whichever was greater.
22
 However, this formula encouraged firms to decrease their R&E in the 
                                                 
22
 Qualified research expenses are those that meet the four tests of: 1) permitted purpose (creating or improving a 
business component), 2) elimination of uncertainty about the development or improvement of a business component, 
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second and third years to maximize the credit in the fourth year. In 1989, the credit was 
reformed; it now establishes a baseline level research proportion (at least 50 percent of qualified 
research expenses) and subsidizes 20 percent of costs that exceed that baseline. Covered 
expenses are wages (for those engaging in, directly supervising, or otherwise supporting 
qualified research), supplies linked to research activities, 65 percent of contract research 
payments to a third party (regardless of success of the project), and 75 percent of basic research 
payments made to non-profit organizations and institutions. The calculation differs based on 
whether the company was traditional (i.e. in existence before 1984 or had at least three taxable 
years between 1983 and 1988) or a start-up (i.e. not traditional).
23
  
 Prior to ATRA, the research and experimentation credit had expired at the end of 2011; 
Congress used ATRA to extend Section 41 through December 21, 2013 and retroactively applied 
it to the 2012 tax year. The JCT (2013) estimates that the R&E credit will cost $6.2 billion in 
2013. 
Section 174 provides two other ways for businesses to fund research and 
experimentation. Section 174(a) allows expensing R&E expenditures when incurred, but this 
option must be used in the first year of R&E expenditures. If Section 174(a) cannot be taken, 
Section 174(b) allows firms to capitalize and amortize qualifying expenditures. Expenditures 
such as the cost of obtaining a patent, or the development of a pilot model are eligible for Section 
174 expensing. The OMB estimates the cost of this tax expenditure to be $5.1 billion dollars in 
2013. 
 Section 199, the qualified production activities income (QPAI ) deduction, allows 
manufacturers to deduct up to 9 percent of domestic production gross receipts in excess of the 
cost of the goods sold and other expenses, losses, and deductions that are attributable to those 
receipts.  Domestic production gross receipts are any receipts that are derived from selling, 
renting, or leasing (or otherwise disposing) of property that was produced, extracted, or grown 
                                                                                                                                                             
3) process of experimentation (one or more alternatives must be attempted), and 4) technological in nature (must 
rely on principles of physical or biological sciences, engineering, or computer science).  
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 The IRS also has an Alternative Simplified Credit for firms that cannot substantiate research expenses for the 
other two credits. 
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predominantly in the United States.
24
  Although it is not directly targeted at small businesses, 
section 199 does help small manufacturing firms.  
The Section 199 deduction started at 3 percent in 2005 and 2006, increased to 6 percent 
through 2009, and was fully phased-in at current 9 percent in 2010. The deduction cannot exceed 
taxable income (or adjusted gross income for those filing as individuals). The OMB (2012) 
estimates that the QPAI will have a tax expenditure cost of $14.5 billion, a fourth of which was 
attributable to individual income taxes.  
 
C.  Other Public Policies Toward Small Business 
Besides the tax provisions noted above, the federal government supports small business 
through numerous public policies and programs. The largest and most significant reside in the 
Small Business Administration, which acts as a “gap lender.” Often small businesses have 
limited assets and a short credit history, which makes it difficult to obtain loans or revolving 
lines of credit from private lenders given normal credit standards. The SBA’s 7(a) General 
Business Loan program facilitates credit for small businesses by guaranteeing term loans or 
revolving lines of credit made by private lenders that otherwise would be declined . Currently, 
the maximum loan guaranteed is $5 million, increased from $2 million by the Small Business 
Act of 2010. At the beginning of the 2011 fiscal year, the SBA had an outstanding cumulative 
balance of $76.2 billion in guaranteed business loans and added $19.6 billion in new business 
loans throughout the fiscal year (OMB 2012).  
The SBA also administers many small business programs, such as the 504 Loan Program , 
the Microloan Program, and the Small Business Investment Company Program. The 504 Loan 
Program facilitates financing for small businesses to purchase fixed assets (e.g. real estate, 
buildings, and machinery) by guaranteeing the loan of a regional nonprofit corporation called a 
Certified Development Company (CDC). The CDC’s loan usually represents 40 percent of the 
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 Major exceptions include selling food or beverage produced at the establishment, transmitting electricity, natural 
gas, and potable water, and selling, leasing, or renting out land.  Domestic production in Puerto Rico was allowed in 
ATRA for 2012 and 2013.  IRC Section 199 was created in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 after a World 
Trade Organization ruled that the United States was explicitly subsidizing exports by excluding foreign trade income 
from taxable income. The Congress repealed the foreign trade income exclusion and created the QPAI deduction, 
which encourages domestic production and implicitly subsidizes exports over imports since importers do not receive 
the same tax benefit; since it applies to domestic producers who do not export, it may not run afoul of WTO rules 
against export subsidies. 
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overall financing for the fixed asset with the borrower providing 10 percent and the primary 
lender the remainder.  
The Microloan Program provides short terms loans of less than 6 year terms, business 
training, and technical training through nonprofit micro-lender intermediaries. The SBA lends 
money to micro-lenders, which is then lent to small businesses. Small business can borrow up to 
$50,000 for developing working capital and purchasing inventory, supplies, equipment, and 
furniture.  
The Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) Program uses qualified private equity 
funds as intermediaries between the SBA and small businesses. Private equity funds receive SBA 
loan guarantees, which they use with their own capital to finance equity capital, long-term loans, 
and management assistance in small businesses.  
The SBA also helps small businesses obtain business opportunities from the federal 
government. By law, 23 percent of federal contracting must go to small businesses (SBA 2012). 
The SBA works with each federal agency to improve the opportunities for small business 
contracts.  
Other federal agencies and departments also support small businesses. Every federal 
agency is required to have an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, which 
helps small businesses take advantage of procurement opportunities and government contracts. 
The State Small Business Credit Initiative subsidizes state programs that facilitate credit to small 
businesses. The Small Business Lending Fund provides capital to qualified community banks 
and community development loan funds who subsequently leverage the capital to provide 
funding to local small businesses.  
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was created in 1982 and has 
been renewed periodically, and the latest legislation authorized it through 2017. The program 
requires federal agencies with extramural research and development budgets exceeding $100 
million to set aside at least 2.5 percent of their research and development budget for contracts or 
grants to small businesses. Eleven government agencies participate in the SBIR, but five 
agencies – the Department of Defense, National Institutes of Health, National Aeronautics Space 
Administration, Department of Energy, and the National Science Foundation – account for 96 
percent of the program’s expenditures. In FY2005, the latest year for which there is available 
data, the program disbursed $1.85 billion dollars in awards to innovative small firms. The 
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program provides firms with Phase I awards, essentially funding a research feasibility study 
worth up to $100,000. In FY2005, 4,208 firms received Phase I funding. About 40 percent of 
these firms eventually receive Phase II awards, which are on the order of about $500,000 to 
$850,000. 
Furthermore, small businesses are exempt from many federal laws and regulations. 
Companies with fewer than 50 employees are exempt from the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(which regulates unpaid leave) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(President Obama’s health care reform act). Those with fewer than 20 employees are exempt 
from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(prohibiting discrimination by race, color, religion and sex). Those with fewer than 15 employees 
are exempt from Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (prohibiting employment 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities). Moreover, larger firms face more stringent 
environmental regulation and face greater reporting requirements to comply with EPA 
regulations (CBO 2012).  
 
 V. Effects of public policies on small business and innovation 
This section reviews the impact of public policies -- in particular tax policies – on the 
behavior of small businesses across a variety of dimensions, including innovation.  
 
A. Entrepreneurial Entry, Exit, and Duration  
The most fundamental choice for a potential entrepreneur is whether to enter the business 
sector in the first place. Bruce (2000, 2002) argues that if the key decision is whether to enter (or 
leave) self-employment, the relevant tax variables to consider relate to the average tax rate in 
each option. If the decision examined is whether to expand or contract one’s hours associated 
with self-employment, the relevant variables are the marginal tax rate in the two sectors.  
Bruce (2000) examines the tax determinants of entry into self-employment using 1979-
1990 data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). He restricts the sample to male 
heads of household between 25 and 54 who are in the wage-and-salary sector in the first 
observed period. 
He defines the tax rate differential as the tax rate an individual would face in a wage and 
salary position minus the one faced in self-employment, and he applies this concept to create the 
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average tax rate differential and the marginal tax rate differentials. Since the author can only 
observe the actual wage-and-salary or self-employment earnings and tax rate for each individual 
for each year, depending on the sector, he estimates the individual’s earnings and tax rate in the 
alternative sector for each year using regression analysis.  
He finds that an increase in the average tax rate differential of 5 percentage points raises 
the probability of transitioning to self-employment in a given year by 0.4 percentage points. This 
implies that facing a lower average tax rate in the self-employment sector relative to the wage 
and salary sector will induce people to move into self-employment. However, the 0.4 percentage 
point effect is small compared to the sample average transition to self-employment probability of 
3.3 percent per year. 
In contrast to the average tax rate results, Bruce shows that increasing the marginal tax 
rate (MTR) differential by 5 percentage points reduces the average transition into self-
employment by 2.4 percentage points. This implies that individuals facing a lower MTR in self-
employment than in the wage and salary sector are less likely to transition to self-employment. 
The MTR effect is quite large relative to a base transition probability of 3.3 percent per year. 
While the direction of the effect may seem counter-intuitive at first, the conclusion is consistent 
with a view that people move to self-employment in part because business ownership may 
provide opportunities to avoid or evade taxes. 
Gentry and Hubbard (2003) also examine the impact of tax policy on entry into self-
employment. Using PSID data from 1979 to 1993, and focusing on heads of households between 
the ages of 18 and 60, they estimate the determinants of entry into self-employment, focusing on 
the marginal tax rate level, as well as the convexity of the tax code – which they define as the 
difference between the average marginal tax rate faced by a successful self-employed individual 
minus the average MTR faced by an unsuccessful one.
25
 The authors also control for individuals’ 
education, earnings potential as an employee, and demographic characteristics, as well as time-
specific macroeconomic factors.  
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 To construct these tax rate estimates, they simulate the income of hypothetical successful and failed entrepreneurs 
for each sample member by assigning various probabilities of success to self-employed individuals and multiplying 
it by their wage income. For instance, they consider four possible “successful” entry outcomes in which the 
individual’s labor income increases by 25, 50, 100, or 200 percent; each of these scenarios are assigned different 
probabilities; the marginal tax rate is calculated in each scenario; and an average marginal tax rate is calculated. The 
same approach is created for “unsuccessful” outcomes, with labor income falling by 10, 25, 50, and 75 percent in the 
different scenario. 
25 
 
Gentry and Hubbard (2003) find that higher marginal tax rates in self-employment have a 
negative impact on entry into self-employment, but this effect is not statistically significant. 
They find that higher average tax rates in self-employment raise entry into self-employment. 
They also show that tax code convexity reduces entry into self-employment. They estimate that a 
five-percentage point increase in the spread between the MTR on successful and failed projects 
reduces the probability of entry in a given year by 0.67 percentage points, from a baseline 
probability of entry of 3.26 percent. Similar results apply for increases in the spread between the 
ATR on successful and failed projects. Their results imply that the tax code imposes a “success” 
tax, since the government claims a larger share of payoffs for successful entrepreneurs.  
Gentry and Hubbard (2004) expand on this work by looking not just at self-employment 
transitions in general, but examining entry to particularly innovative new industries or 
occupations.
26
 They show that the entry rate into innovative occupations and industries is lower 
than in the overall self-employment sector. They find that higher marginal tax rates and a more 
convex tax system reduce entry into self-employment for people who were previously employed 
in innovative industries and occupations.  
Cullen and Gordon (2007) present a theoretical examination of the effects of the tax code 
on an individual’s decision move to the entrepreneurial sector.27 For a high-income, risk-neutral 
investor, a graduated tax rates discourages entrepreneurial activity, since it taxes gains more than 
it subsidizes losses, while the payroll tax phase-out creates a subsidy to risk-taking by making 
the tax schedule less convex. For risk-averse individuals, a progressive tax structure can generate 
more entrepreneurial activity and risk-taking, since progressive taxes provide a form of insurance 
by imposing lower average tax rates when income is low and higher average tax rates when 
income is high. For risk-neutral or risk-seeking individuals, however, progressive taxation (with 
less than full offset) will reduce entrepreneurial activity.  
While the studies above examine the determinants of entry into small and innovative 
businesses, Bruce (2002) examines the determinants of exit from self-employment. He uses 
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 They define innovative industries to include those in machinery, transportation equipment, scientific instruments, 
chemicals, petroleum and coal, rubber and plastics, commercial research, development and testing labs, and 
computer programming services, while innovative occupations include computer specialists, engineers, scientists, 
science and engineering technicians, science teachers and operations and science researchers. 
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 The authors use self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurial activity. 
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PSID data from 1979 to 1990 and confines the analysis to male heads of households between 25 
and 54 that are self-employed. Bruce finds that entrepreneurs with higher expected ATRs in self-
employment (holding wage and salary ATR constant) are less likely to exit self-employment. For 
instance, a 1 percent increase in the self-employment ATR would reduce the self-employment 
exit rate from 14.6 percent to 14.0 percent in annual data – this finding differs from Bruce 
(2000). Bruce’s analysis on the marginal tax rate effects, however, is consistent with his earlier 
work, since he finds that, for example, a 1 percent increase in the self-employment MTR reduces 
the probability of exit from 14.6 percent to 5.9 percent. This result may be explained either by a 
tax avoidance or evasion argument or by the fact that higher tax rates act as insurance against 
fluctuating income.  
In a related paper, Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2007) examine the duration of 
entrepreneurial spells, using panel data from 1979 to 1990 that includes over 200,000 tax returns. 
Entrepreneurial exit is marked as having entrepreneurial activity in one year but not in the 
following one, where entrepreneurial activity is defined by having schedule C income (sole 
proprietorship), income from partnerships or royalty and rental income. The average length of 
entrepreneurial spells in their data is 3-4 years. The authors observe the tax rate for individuals in 
each sector (wage and entrepreneurial) and use TAXSIM to estimate the tax rate they would 
have faced in the alternative sector. They find that a 1 percentage point decline in the marginal 
tax rate on wage income reduces entrepreneurship spells by 16.1 percent for single filers and 
12.7 percent for married ones, while a similar cut in the MTR on business income increases 
spells by 32.5 percent and 44.8 percent for single and married filers, respectively. Given these 
results, an across-the-board cut in tax rates would have a net positive impact on entrepreneurial 
spell length.  
 
B.  Financing of Start-Ups 
 Financing is a crucial consideration for any business, but especially for start-ups.  The 
unique circumstances of start-ups often distinguish their financing from that of more traditional 
firms.  Since startups typically have few assets and are not profitable for the first years of their 
existence, the traditional model of debt financing is rarely available (Denis 2004). Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs bear an enormous amount of risk, at least until an IPO occurs or the company is 
acquired (Hall and Woodward 2010).  There is substantial evidence that many start-ups face 
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borrowing constraints (see, for example, Evans and Jovanovic 1989 and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian 
and Rosen 1994).  Still, the notion that “opaque start-ups” are left to starve for financing on a 
diet of the owner’s credit cards and friends’ and family’s largesse is a “myth from the classroom” 
(Robinson 2012).   
 Using data from the Kauffman firm survey, Robinson (2012) and Robb and Robinson 
(2012) present a more nuanced picture. Startups are typically grouped by stage of development: 
seed, early stage, expansion, or later stage.  The primary sources of seed financing are owner and 
insider equity and debt, and personal bank loans, often with the owner’s house used as collateral.  
With the advent of crowdfunding (recently allowed by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 
or JOBS Act), outsider equity may start to play a larger role in the financing of startups, and 
recent evidence suggest that venture capital funds are starting to invest in earlier stages of 
startups.
28
 
 Once a product is developed and the market potential of the product is less uncertain, 
startups may start to gain outsider equity through angel investors and venture capital funds. 
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who make investments in young companies, providing 
the needed capital to advance to a later stage of growth. Venture capital firms mostly provide 
funding to early stage, expansion, and later stage startups before a startup issues an IPO.  In 
addition, formal bank lending is often a significant component of financing at every stage of 
business development.   
 Tax policy affects financing issues in two principal ways – the tax deduction for interest 
payments, which is a normal operating part of the income tax, and the preferential rate on capital 
gains, which affects venture capital.  In principle, taxes can affect both the supply and demand 
for venture capital.  In practice, the evidence seems to suggest that supply effects are weak but 
demand effects are present.  Poterba (1989) shows that most suppliers of venture capital are not 
even affected by changes in the individual income tax treatment of capital gains, interest and 
dividends.  Likewise, Gompers and Lerner (1999) show that venture capital commitments by 
taxable and tax-exempt investors are roughly equally responsive to changes in capital gains tax 
rates, a trend that would not occur if the supply of venture capital funds were tax-sensitive.  
However, both Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that the demand for venture 
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Financing Survey,” March 2012. 
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capital among entrepreneurs increases with reductions in capital gains tax rates, as compensation 
via corporate stock can be substituted for wage and salary compensation. 
 
C. Employment, Investment, and Firm Size  
Holtz-Eakin (1995) argues that subsidies of small businesses through the tax code (and 
by inference other public policies) effectively constitute a tax on growth since the preferential 
treatment phases out and is eventually eliminated as a firm yields more revenue or hires more 
employees – that is, subsidies to encourage small business entry may actually discourage their 
growth. 
Carroll, et. al (1998a, 1998b, and 2000) analyze the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 -- which lowered the highest personal income tax rates significantly -- on small business 
hiring, growth, and investment. The studies examine a sample of sole proprietors taken from 
income tax returns, based on income data from 1985 and in 1988. 
Carroll et. al (1998a) construct estimates of the user cost of capital and examine how tax 
reform affected the user cost and how the changes in the user cost affect firms’ willingness to 
make capital investments. About 33 percent of Schedule C filers made some positive capital 
investment in 1985, a figure that dropped to 29 percent in 1988. They find that increasing 
marginal tax rates of each entrepreneur by 5 percentage points would reduce the mean likelihood 
of making any positive investment by 10.4 percent, from 33.5 percent to 30.0 percent.  
Carroll et al. (1998b) look at how the same tax reform affects an employer’s labor 
demand choices. About 34.1 percent of Schedule C filers employed labor (reported a positive 
wage bill) in 1985, compared to 32.8 percent in 1988. The authors find that lowering the 
employer’s marginal tax rate by 10 percent increased the mean probability of hiring workers 
from 21.5 percent to 24.1 percent. Note that wage payments are expensed under the income tax. 
Thus, one has to appeal to a cash flow model to explain the results -- that is, lowering tax rates 
increases the entrepreneur’s cash flow and allows them to hire more workers.  
Carroll et al. (2000) also estimated the effect of the tax reform act of 1986 on growth of 
gross receipts in small business firms. The authors find a large and negative effect of the 
marginal tax rate on sole proprietor gross receipts. They estimate that a decline in sole 
proprietors’ average marginal tax rate from 50 percent to 33 percent would lead to an increase in 
gross receipts of about 28 percent. However, this may reflect shifts from the corporate to the 
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non-corporate or subchapter S corporate forms among closely held companies and may not 
reflect the effect of the marginal tax rate on business income. 
 
D. Innovation and risk-taking 
 Both the Research and Experimentation (R&E) tax credit and the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) may influence innovation among small businesses. Most studies of 
the R&E credit examine the impact on R&E spending, as opposed to more direct measures of 
innovation, and most focus on large business. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) conduct a meta-
analysis of studies of the credit and find that the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending was 
about 1 during the 1980s. More recently, Rao (2010) provides results along similar lines.  
Gupta, Hwang and Schmidt (2011) examine the effect of the 1989 R&E credit reform 
(described above) on R&E spending intensity (R&E spending divided by sales), using data from 
1981 through 1995 and treating the reform as a natural experiment, thus serving as a source of 
exogenous variation in firms’ incentives. They find that the median R&E intensity of high-tech 
firms that qualified for the credit increased by 15.9 percent in 1990-1994, relative to the 1986-
1989 period. The results imply that qualified research expenditures in 1990-1994 were $3.72 
billion higher, or 15 percent, higher than they would have been without the reform.  
The studies noted above focus on all firms. Since small firms claim just a small portion of 
the credit – for example, in 2008, firms with less than $1,000,000 in assets claimed just 1.8 
percent of the credit – it is difficult to gather data to evaluate the effect of the credit on such 
firms. This is in part due to the fact that the R&D credit is non-refundable, which means that 
firms that do not have taxable income (mostly small and/or young firms) are not eligible for the 
credit. Nonetheless, Park (2011) shows that small firms spend a higher fraction of their revenue 
on R&E than large firms.  
Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) estimate that, in the Netherlands, the R&E tax credit 
encouraged R&E spending, with a 10 percent decrease in the user cost of R&E increasing the 
long-run R&E stock by 4.6 percent. The authors find larger elasticities for smaller firms than for 
larger firms, and hypothesize that the credit plays a major role in helping small firms in 
increasing their R&E expenditures because of capital constraints that limit their ability to invest 
in resources they deem necessary. 
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There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of the SBIR program. Lerner (1996) 
examines the impact of SBIR on employment and sales growth in a set of 1135 firms. He 
compares Phase II recipients of SBIR grants to a matching sample of non-recipient firms 
(including some who received Phase I funding) and finds stronger growth in sales and 
employment for recipient firms in the 1985-1995 period compared to non-recipient ones, 
controlling for sales and employment in 1985. 
Lerner looks at the demographic specifications of the firms to evaluate the impact of 
SBIR with respect to the presence of venture financing. Since venture financing is concentrated 
in certain parts of the country, the author tries to determine whether SBIR has greater effects in 
regions where other types of financing were already available. He found that the positive impacts 
of the program were only significant in areas where venture financing was already present. For 
instance, employment increased by 47 percent in firms located in the venture-capital heavy areas 
while employment decreased by 5 percent for the non-awardees. (In other areas, the sectors grew 
by 13 percent and 10 percent, respectively.) The author also compared growth in Phase I firms to 
non-awardees, to ensure that the SBIR program is not simply identifying superior firms and 
found that the growth of these two sets of firms did not differ significantly (both lagged behind 
Phase II award recipients.  
The National Research Council recently conducted a study of SBIR grant recipients. The 
survey indicated that 47 percent of Phase II recipients reported sales greater than $0, although 
over half of the sales dollars came from 26 firms that reported over $15,000,000 in sales. The 
same survey showed that the average responding firm had 29.9 more employees than at the time 
of the award; however, the measure did not include those that did not respond and were more 
likely to have failed. Finally, 55 percent of respondents attribute over half of their growth to their 
initial SBIR grant. 
Cullen and Gordon (2007) develop a model that incorporates numerous features of the 
tax code and examines how previous tax reforms affected entrepreneurial risk-taking. They 
define risk-taking as whether the individual reported non-corporate losses greater than 10 percent 
of reported wage and salary income – they argue that while profits can take place even without 
risk, losses should only occur if a firm has undertaken a risky project. They find that the 1986 tax 
reform lowered personal tax rates relative to the capital gains tax rate, which resulted in 
entrepreneurs being responsible for more of their losses, yet keeping less of their capital gains, 
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thus discouraging risk-taking. They also estimate that entrepreneurial risk-taking fall by 14 
percent due to the 2001 and 2005 tax reforms, due to the drop in personal income tax rates. They 
also examine more canonical tax reforms such as broadening the base or moving to a flat tax. 
They conclude that broadening the base by closing loopholes would decrease entrepreneurship 
by as much as 22 percent relative to the 2005 benchmark since a smaller fraction of business 
losses would be deductible and because the Section 172 provision, which allows for net 
operating losses to be carried back and forward would be discontinued. Furthermore, a 19 
percent flat tax (which would leave revenue unaffected) would increase risk-taking among all 
income quintiles, except for the top one, resulting in an overall increase in risk-taking of 17 
percent from the 2005 benchmark.  
 
E.  Organizational Form 
 Because of the different taxation of C corporations versus pass through organizations and 
sole proprietorship, tax policy may impact the organizational form of entrepreneurial ventures.
29
  
Indeed, since the tax reform act of 1986, there has been a substantial shift in organizational form, 
away from C Corporations and toward pass throughs (see Figure 1). 
Several researchers have studied the impact of tax policy, in particular the distinctions 
between corporate and individual taxation, on how firms choose to organize.  Although much of 
this literature focuses on analysis of the implied deadweight loss of the corporate income tax, in 
this section we focus on the positive (as opposed to normative) question of how the tax 
differentials affect entrepreneurs’ choice of organizational form.   
Researchers have taken a number of approaches to this question.  One approach uses pre-
1986 data.  Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997) examine the responsiveness of organizational 
form choices to the relative taxation of corporate and personal income taxes during the 1959 to 
1986 period. They find little impact of taxation on the share of capital in C corporations. 
However, as Goolsbee (1998) points out, almost all of their variation is due to changes in the 
personal income tax, and responsiveness to changes in corporate taxes could differ. 
 Goolsbee (1998) examines this question looking at data from 1900 to 1939.   Although 
this information is more dated than Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), and has the implications 
that some organizational forms that exist today (e.g., S corporations) did not exist in the sample 
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period, his analysis has the advantage of exploring a time period that contains more variation in 
the corporate tax rate, relative to the personal income tax rate on dividends and capital gains.   
His results, nevertheless, suggest that corporate income taxes have only a small impact on 
organizational form choices.   
 Two papers examine the impact of the 1986 tax reform act on organizational form 
choices.   Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990) examine the effects of the 1986 tax reform on 
organizational choice.  The 1986 act significantly reduced the top tax rate on corporate income as 
well as individual income, and closed loopholes in the treatment of business income and both the 
corporate and non-corporate sector. The authors argue that the changes in taxation induced by 
TRA 1986 were complex and that, depending on a firm’s circumstances, the changes might lead 
to a preference for corporate or non-corporate status.   Nevertheless, they do find the notable 
empirical patterns that loss operations tended to shift to the corporate sector after 1986 and gains 
tended to shift to the non-corporate sector.  
 Carroll and Joulfaian (1997) use a panel of corporate tax returns from 1985 to 1990 to 
estimate the impact of the 1986 tax reform act on organizational form.  They find that increases 
in the tax differential between corporate and non-corporate businesses will raise the probability 
that a C corporation converts to S corporation status, and they show that the tax savings are 
largest for the most profitable firms.   
 Two papers have used state-level variation in taxes. Goolsbee (2004) uses cross-sectional 
state-level data to estimate the sensitivity of organizational form to tax parameters.  The evidence 
shows that increasing the differential between corporate and non-corporate activity raises the 
sales, employment and number of firms accounted for by non-corporate entities.  One possible 
concern with cross-sectional data exploiting state-level variation in tax rules is that the results 
could be capturing other state-specific effects and mislabeling them as tax effects.   However, 
Luna and Murray (2010) use panel-level data from the states and document a similar 
sensitivity.
30
    
 
VI. Conclusion  
 Federal policies tend to favor and support small businesses over larger enterprises, 
including tax incentives and programs operated or administered by the Small Business 
                                                 
30
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Administration. The support is founded on the notion that small businesses are integral to the 
U.S. economy, job growth, and innovation; yet the evidence is mixed about the efficacy of this 
support: studies have started to question whether the size of a firm or its age is the correct 
variable to analyze. 
 Our primary conclusions run along two dimensions. First, in terms of policy, it is crucial 
for policy makers, the media and the public to understand that issues regarding innovation and 
entrepreneurship are conceptually distinct from issues regarding small businesses. Second, in 
terms of research, more is needed to understand the distinctions of small business versus 
entrepreneurial business and to understand the impact of taxes and other policies, on start-up, 
financing, investment, and organizational form of entrepreneurial enterprises.  The literature on 
small business entry and exit provides, at best, mixed evidence as to what extent tax policy 
influences an individual’s entry into or exit from entrepreneurship. The impact of public policies 
on innovation is even less well understood.  As information has become more available and as 
tax policy has changed dramatically in the past quarter-century, further analysis would appear to 
be very profitable for understanding the small business sector, the entrepreneurial sector, the role 
of innovation, and the appropriate stance of federal policy.  
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Table 1 
Subchapter C Corporation Tax Rate Schedule 
 Minimum 
Taxable Income 
 Maximum 
Taxable Income 
Marginal Tax 
Rate 
Cumulative Tax 
Owed 
Effective Tax 
Rate 
              -            50,000  15.0           7,500  15.0 
        50,000          75,000  25.0         13,750  18.3 
        75,000        100,000  34.0         22,250  22.3 
      100,000        335,000  39.0       113,900  34.0 
      335,000    10,000,000  34.0     3,400,000  34.0 
  10,000,000    15,000,000  35.0     5,150,000  34.3 
  15,000,000    18,333,333  38.0     6,416,667  35.0 
  18,333,333    35.0   35.0 
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Table 2 
Sources of Small Business Income 
 
Tax Form Filers Percent 
Total 
Income Percent 
Net 
Income Percent 
Filers Reporting Some Form of Pass-Through 
Income 
4427
3 100.0% 
3624
5 100.0% 3246 100.0% 
Income Qualifies as Business Income 
2418
4 54.6% 
3597
5 99.3% 3080 94.9% 
Income Qualifies as Small Business 
Income 
2394
2 54.1% 6455 17.8% 517 15.9% 
       
Tax Form Filers Percent 
Total 
Income Percent 
Net 
Income Percent 
Schedule C: Sole Proprietors 
1067
9 44.6% 1136 17.6% 
222 
42.9% 
Schedule E: Rent 4592 19.2% 208 3.2% -21 -4.1% 
Schedule F: Farmers 1415 5.9% 125 1.9% -13 -2.5% 
Form 1065: Partnerships 2232 9.3% 1163 18.0% 167 32.3% 
Form 1130-S: S Corporations 3462 14.5% 2418 37.5% 169 32.7% 
Form 1120: C Corporations 1563 6.5% 1405 21.8% -6 -1.2% 
Total 
2394
2 100.0% 6455 100.0% 517 100.0% 
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Table 3 
Small Businesses by Industry 
 
Industry Firms Percent 
Total 
Income Percent 
Net 
Income Percent 
Real Estate and Rental 7067 29.5% 855 13.2% 84 16.2% 
Construction 2609 10.9% 939 14.5% 51 9.9% 
Professional and Technical 2266 9.5% 639 9.9% 107 20.7% 
Agriculture 1786 7.5% 233 3.6% -6 -1.2% 
Retail 1738 7.3% 874 13.5% 17 3.3% 
Health Care and Social 
Services 1250 5.2% 468 7.3% 74 14.3% 
Transportation 1019 4.3% 238 3.7% 13 2.5% 
Administrative and Support 1010 4.2% 239 3.7% 18 3.5% 
Financial 755 3.2% 299 4.6% 90 17.4% 
Accommodation and Food 627 2.6% 306 4.7% 7 1.4% 
All Other Services 3816 15.9% 1365 21.1% 64 12.4% 
Total 23942 
100.0
% 6455 
100.0
% 517 100.0% 
 Table 4 
Small Business Owners by Various Definitions 
 
Previous Treasury Definition
1
 
AGI Level 
2007 Tax 
returns 
Number of 
Returns 
Percent of 
Returns 
Percent of 
Definition 
$0 - $200,000 138441 31851 22.3% 91.7% 
$200,00 - $1,000,000 4145 2557 1.8% 7.4% 
$1,000,000 + 392 331 0.2% 1.0% 
Total 142978 34739 
24.3% 
100.0
% 
    
  
 
     
Treasury's Broad Definition
2
 
AGI Level 
2007 Tax 
returns 
Number of 
Returns Percent 
Percent of 
Definition 
$0 - $200,000 138441 17738 12.4% 88.6% 
$200,00 - $1,000,000 4145 2005 1.4% 10.0% 
$1,000,000 + 392 273 0.2% 1.4% 
Total 142978 20016 
14.0% 
100.0
% 
  
  
  
 
     
Treasury's Narrow Definition
3
 
AGI Level 
2007 Tax 
returns 
Number of 
Returns Percent 
Percent of 
Definition 
$0 - $200,000 138441 8682 6.1% 92.5% 
$200,00 - $1,000,000 4145 656 0.5% 7.0% 
$1,000,000 + 392 51 0.0% 0.5% 
Total 142978 9389 
6.6% 
100.0
% 
          
1. Treasury's previous definition counted all taxpayers reporting flow-through income as small business owners. 
2. Treasury's broad definition counts anyone (even passive partners) who report income that meets their criteria of small 
business income as small business owners. 
3. Treasury's narrow definition only counts individuals who report active small business income or loss that represents at 
least 25 percent of their AGI. 
Source: Knittel et al. (2011). 
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Table 5 
Income Distribution by Various Definitions of Small Business Owners 
 
Previous Treasury Definition
1
 
AGI Level Total Income 
Small Business 
Income 
Small Business 
Income as Percent 
of Total Income 
Proportion of 
Small Business 
Income 
$0 - $200,000 N/A 162 N/A 24.5% 
$200,00 - $1,000,000 N/A 242 N/A 36.6% 
$1,000,000 + N/A 258 N/A 39.0% 
All N/A 662 N/A 
100.0
% 
    
 
 
 
 
  
Treasury's Broad Definition
2
 
AGI Level Total Income 
Small Business 
Income 
Small Business 
Income as Percent 
of Total Business 
Income 
Percent of Small 
Business Income 
$0 - $200,000 969 134 13.8% 35.6% 
$200,00 - $1,000,000 774 175 22.6% 46.5% 
$1,000,000 + 1075 67 6.2% 17.8% 
All 2818 376 13.3% 
100.0
% 
    
 
 
      
Treasury's Broad Narrow
3
 
AGI Level Total Income 
Small Business 
Income 
Small Business 
Income as Percent 
of Total Business 
Income 
Percent of Small 
Business Income 
$0 - $200,000 360 144 40.0% 43.0% 
$200,00 - $1,000,000 255 144 56.5% 43.0% 
$1,000,000 + 102 47 46.1% 14.0% 
All 717 335 46.7% 
100.0
% 
          
1. Treasury's previous definition counted all taxpayers reporting flow-through income as small business owners. 
2. Treasury's broad definition counts anyone (even passive partners) who report income that meets their criteria of small business income as 
small business owners. 
3 
 
3. Treasury's narrow definition only counts individuals who report active small business income or loss that represents at least 25 percent of 
their AGI. 
Source: Knittel et al. (2011). 
 
Table 6 
Financing Source for Startups 
            
  Mean (all Firms)   
Percent of 
Financing   
Firms Using 
Financing 
Stream   
Percent of Using 
Firms 
  Equity Debt   Equity Debt   Equity Debt   Equity Debt 
Owner 27,365 3,506 
 
34.9% 4.5% 
 
3292 1221 
 
79.1% 29.3% 
Insider 1,695 7,605 
 
2.2% 9.7% 
 
186 564 
 
4.5% 13.5% 
Outsider 6,979 31,255   8.9% 39.9%   223 1487   5.4% 35.7% 
Total 36,039 42,366 
 
46.0% 54.0% 
 
4163 
 
N/A 
            Source. Robb and Robinson (2009). 
         
 
